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One of the many cruel facts about the United
States’ death penalty system is that a number of
people sentenced to death suffer from mental
illness, including serious mental conditions such as
schizophrenia or other psychotic or delusional
disorders. The United States Supreme Court
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on
mentally retarded defendants,1 on juveniles,2 and
on persons who do not commit a homicide.3 With
respect to persons who suffer from mental illness,
the Court in Ford v. Wainwright continued the
long-recognized common-law tradition of
prohibiting the execution of persons who are
“insane” at the time of their executions.4
Unfortunately, this exemption fails to encompass
many people suffering from severe mental illness,5
thus leaving mentally ill death row inmates still
subject to the executioner’s needle. 
This article examines two major Supreme Court
decisions addressing the execution of the mentally ill
in the United States: Ford v.
Wainwright,6 and Panetti v.
Quarterman.7 In considering
the shortcomings of the
standards set out in these
cases, the article then discusses
the American Bar Association’s
recommendations as well as
the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights’ statements
regarding the execution of the
mentally ill. Ultimately, the
article finds the United States’
current systems for protecting the mentally ill from
execution are inadequate and calls for a more
comprehensive remedy to this problem.
1. United States Supreme Court Case Law
Regarding the Execution of the Mentally
Ill
A. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)
In Ford v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court
considered the pending execution of Alvin Bernard
Ford, a mentally ill death row inmate who had
been sentenced to death in Florida for a 1974
murder.8 In the years leading up to his execution,
Ford displayed increasingly bizarre and irrational
behaviors, including delusions and paranoia.9 At
one point Ford deteriorated “into nearly complete
incomprehensibility, speaking only in a code
characterized by intermittent use of the word
‘one,’ making statements such as ‘Hands one, face
one. Mafia one. God one, father one, Pope one.
Pope one. Leader one.’”10
At least one doctor diagnosed Ford with a severe
mental disorder, which appeared similar to
paranoid schizophrenia, and Ford’s attorneys
sought review of Florida’s ability to carry out the
death penalty on someone as mentally ill as Ford.11
A psychiatrist who examined Ford on behalf of the
defense “concluded that Ford had no
understanding of why he was being executed,
made no connection between
the homicide of which he had
been convicted and the death
penalty, and indeed sincerely
believed that he would not be
executed because he owned
the prisons and could control
the Governor through mind
waves.”12 Nonetheless, the
State of Florida still wanted to
execute him.13 Under the state
process for determining
competency for execution,
the psychiatrists assigned to evaluate Ford found
him suffering from some form of mental illness or
disorder, but nonetheless concluded that he was
sufficiently competent to be executed.14 Florida’s
governor, accordingly, found that Ford was not
insane and could be executed.15 Eventually, Ford’s
appeal of the governor’s decision reached the
Supreme Court. 
One of the important holdings in Ford v.
Wainwright is the plurality’s conclusion that
carrying out an execution on a person who is insane
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violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against
cruel and unusual punishments. In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Marshall traced the long
common law history prohibiting the execution of
the insane. Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion
observed that in 1791, at the time of the ratification
of the Eighth Amendment to the Bill of Rights of the
United States Constitution, the
common law outlawed the
execution of the insane.16
Indeed, the opinion noted that
in the eighteenth century,
Blackstone denounced the
execution of the insane as
“savage and inhuman.”17 As
Justice Powell observed in his concurring opinion in
Ford, some of the major legal writers of the late
eighteenth century described the execution of the
insane as “a miserable spectacle . . . of extream
inhumanity and cruelty” and “against christian
charity to send a great offender quick . . . into
another world, when he is not of a capacity to fit
himself for it.”18 In 1985, the year the Supreme Court
was considering Ford’s claim, no state allowed an
execution to be carried out on a person deemed
insane.19 In accord with the common law and the
contemporary prohibition on the execution of the
insane, the Ford Court found that the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the
execution of someone who is insane or has become
insane since the imposition of his death sentence.20
The question remains, however, as to what is
sufficient to prove that a capital defendant is
insane and therefore exempt from the death
penalty. Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ford does not
address this issue directly, but rather focuses on
the procedures that must be afforded a capital
defendant making a claim that his mental state
renders him insane and ineligible to suffer
execution.21 In fact, in spite of all the evidence of
Ford’s delusions and disorganized thinking, the
Ford Court did not decide that
Ford was in fact insane and no
longer eligible for the death
penalty. Rather, the Court
remanded the case to the
lower federal courts to make
that determination. Despite
all the evidence of Ford’s
mental illness that the
Supreme Court referred to in
its decision, in 1989, a federal
district court found Ford was
sane and could be executed.22
Ford died in prison at the age
of thirty-seven while his appeal of the district
court’s sanity order was before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 11th Circuit.23
Although Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion in
Ford did not define insanity, Justice Powell’s
concurrence opined that insanity for purposes of
exempting a defendant from the death penalty
applies to “those who are
unaware of the punishment
they are about to suffer and
why they are to suffer it.”24
As Justice Powell observed,
one of the chief justifications
for the modern death penalty
is retribution and this goal
cannot be achieved if the defendant is so mentally
disabled that he is unaware of, or incapable of
comprehending, his impending execution or the
reason for it.25 Thus, at a minimum, Justice Powell
concluded that states must set standards to
prevent the execution of prisoners “who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to
suffer and why they are to suffer it.”26 It is this
definition of insanity that legislatures and courts
often use to guide their protection of the mentally
ill facing execution.27
B. Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007)
Recently, the Court again faced the dilemma of a
severely mentally ill man slated to die. In Panetti v.
Quarterman, the Court considered the fate of
Scott Louis Panetti who has suffered from severe
mental illness for many years.28 As his execution
approached, Panetti sought state judicial review of
his mental competency to face execution.
However, as detailed by the United States Supreme
Court, this Texas state process was woefully
deficient and failed to meet the minimal
procedural protections required by Ford.29 In
addition to the deficiencies in the state
proceedings, the Supreme Court also found that
the federal court reviewing
Panetti’s case erred, at least
in part, because it employed
an approach to mental illness
that was too narrow to
afford the appropriate scope
of constitutional protection
to the mentally ill sentenced
to die.
As the Supreme Court noted,
Panetti suffers from a long
history of severe mental
illness. One expert described
Panetti’s illness as a “schizo-affective disorder,” and
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defense experts opined that Panetti suffers from
delusions, including delusions about the effect and
reality of his pending execution.30 Even the state’s
expert witnesses acknowledged that Panetti suffers
from mental problems, although these experts
disagreed about his
perceptions, cognitive ability,
and competency to face
execution.31 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found
Panetti mentally competent to
be executed based on the fact
that Panetti was aware that
he was going to be executed
and why he was going to be
executed; evidence that
Panetti did not have a rational
understanding of his execution and the reason for it
was deemed not relevant to the determination of
competency.32 The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Fifth Circuit, finding the lower court’s
interpretation of the Ford test of insanity too
narrow.33
In articulating the standard for mental competence
to be executed, the Supreme Court recognized that
the complexity of mental illness could cause an
individual to have an awareness of his pending
execution and the stated reason for the execution,34
but nonetheless deprive him of the ability to
rationally comprehend the basis for the execution.
The Court reasoned, “the Ford [plurality and
concurring] opinions nowhere indicate that
delusions are irrelevant to ‘comprehen[sion]’ or
‘aware[ness]’ if they so impair the prisoner's concept
of reality that he cannot reach a rational
understanding of the reason for the execution. If
anything, the Ford majority suggests the opposite.”35
The Panetti Court particularly observed that such a
lack of rational comprehension of the reasons for
the imposition of the death penalty undermines the
purpose of retribution that this punishment is said
to serve.36 Thus, psychotic disorders that prevent a
person from rationally
comprehending the purpose of
his execution could be
sufficient to render him
incompetent to suffer
execution.37 As the Court put
it, “[g]ross delusions stemming
from a severe mental disorder
may put an awareness of a link
between a crime and its
punishment in a context so far
removed from reality that the
punishment can serve no proper purpose.”38
The Supreme Court remanded Panetti’s case to the
lower federal courts for further proceedings to
determine if Panetti could suffer execution
notwithstanding his mental illness. On March 26,
2008, the federal district court tasked with re-
examining Panetti’s claim of incompetency once
again found that the State of
Texas could execute Panetti.39
The district court chronicled





and diagnoses of major
depression, schizoaffective
disorder and schizophrenia.40
Much of this mental health
history pre-dates the murders of his in-laws for
which he was sentenced to death. The opinion also
discussed Panetti’s bizarre behavior during trial
where, among other things, Panetti represented
himself dressed in a cowboy outfit and subpoenaed
John F. Kennedy and Jesus Christ as witnesses.41 The
court also noted that after the trial and during his
time on death row, Panetti was referred to
psychiatric treatment on several occasions,
although some of the doctors questioned the extent
of the mental illness and the reliability of Panetti’s
representations of his symptoms.42
The court summarized the doctors’ assessment of
Panetti for present competence. One of the defense
experts described Panetti’s behavior and
performance on multiple cognitive and mental tests
as “consistent with the frontal-executive deficits
that one expects to see in individuals with chronic
psychotic disorders such as Schizoaffective disorder
and Schizophrenia.”43 Another expert for the
defense found Panetti genuinely delusional, not
malingering, and suffering from schizophrenia.44 A
third defense expert opined that Panetti suffered
from a severe psychotic condition and lacked the
ability to rationally understand the reasons for his
pending execution.45 In
contrast, the state’s experts
disagreed with the defense
experts’ diagnoses, finding
that Panetti could talk
rationally about other
subjects and believing that
Panetti was malingering.46 One
state doctor found that
Panetti had a rational
understanding of his death
sentence and the reason for
that sentence.47 The court also described taped
conversations between Panetti and his family,
opining that Panetti’s conversations with his family
U.S.A. Focus
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execution. 
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were rational and organized, if somewhat self-
centered.48
In reviewing the record, the district court
concluded that “Panetti is seriously mentally ill. He
has suffered from severe mental illness, aggravated
by alcohol and substance abuse, since well before
he murdered Joe and Amanda Alvarado. He was
under the influence of this severe mental illness
when he killed the Alvarados as well as when he
insisted on representing himself at trial.”49 The
court further stated that while there is mixed
evidence on the extent of malingering behaviors,
“it is not seriously disputable
that Panetti suffers from
paranoid delusions of some
type, and these delusions may
well have contributed to his
murder of Joe and Amanda
Alvarado.”50 Nonetheless, the
court concluded that Panetti
had a rational understanding
of the causal connection
between his crime and his
pending execution. The court
recognized that Panetti is a
mentally ill, delusional man
and that Panetti “was
mentally ill when he committed his crime and
continues to be mentally ill today.”51 Nonetheless,
the district court determined that Panetti “has
both a factual and rational understanding of his
crime, his impending death, and the causal
retributive connection between the two.
Therefore, if any mentally ill person is competent
to be executed for his crimes, this record
establishes it is Scott Panetti.”52
C. Concluding Thoughts on Ford and Panetti
Both Ford and Panetti can be praised for making
clear that severely mentally ill death row inmates,
who lack a rational understanding of their
execution and the purpose for it, are not competent
enough for the state to kill. Yet, it is both telling and
disturbing that in both Ford and Panetti, the
defendants, who displayed delusional, disorganized
and bizarre behavior for many years, were
nonetheless found by lower federal courts to be
sane enough to be executed. Ford’s death in prison
precluded the Supreme Court from reviewing Ford’s
sanity determination. Panetti’s case is still pending
in the appeal process. However, the fact that both
of these men failed to meet the test of insanity
according to a lower federal court raises serious
questions and doubts about the real value of the
insanity exemption for executions.
2. ABA Recommendation on the Execution of
the Mentally Ill
The case of Panetti, even under the Supreme
Court’s presumably more protective definition of
competence to be executed, demonstrates that
mentally ill people who suffer from psychosis and
delusions can and will be executed in the United
States. The American Bar Association has sought to
deal with this problem, and it offers solutions more
humane and protective than the current standard
tolerated by the Supreme Court while at the same
time more consistent with the penological goal of
retribution.
In August of 2006, the
American Bar Association
House of Delegates adopted a
recommendation on the
imposition of the death
penalty on persons with
mental disabilities, including
mental illness.53 The first
paragraph of the ABA
Recommendation and Report
calls for a ban on the
execution of persons with
“significant limitations in
both their intellectual functioning and adaptive
behavior.”54 This recommendation implements the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins v.
Virginia,55 in which the Supreme Court decided
that the execution of persons with mental
retardation violates the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.56
The second and third paragraphs of the ABA
Recommendation and Report address more
specifically persons suffering from severe mental
illness. The second paragraph of the Report
provides:
Defendants should not be executed or sentenced
to death if, at the time of the offense, they had a
severe mental disorder or disability that
significantly impaired their capacity (a) to
appreciate the nature, consequences or
wrongfulness of their conduct, (b) to exercise
rational judgment in relation to conduct, or (c) to
conform their conduct to the requirements of the
law. A disorder manifested primarily by repeated
criminal conduct or attributable solely to the
acute effects of voluntary use of alcohol or other
drugs does not, standing alone, constitute a
mental disorder or disability for purposes of this
provision.57
This recommendation would “prohibit execution of
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persons with severe mental disabilities whose
demonstrated impairments of mental and emotional
functioning at the time of the offense would render
a death sentence disproportionate to their
culpability.”58 This recommendation focuses on
limiting the application of the death penalty to
persons who possess a sufficient degree of
blameworthiness for a properly proportional
imposition of the death penalty,59 and is meant to
apply the principles of Atkins v. Virginia60 and Roper
v. Simmons61 to persons with severe mental illness,
particularly persons suffering from DSM-IV-Tr Axis I
diagnoses,62 including schizophrenia and psychotic
disorders.63 Given Panetti’s severe mental illness at
the time of the commission of his crime, it is
possible that he would have
fallen within the protection of
this recommendation and
been spared the death
penalty.
The third recommendation
deals with death row inmates




that “[a] sentence of death should not be carried
out if the prisoner has a mental disorder or
disability that significantly impairs his or her
capacity . . . to understand the nature and purpose
of the punishment, or to appreciate the reason for
its imposition in the prisoner’s own case.”64 This
recommendation addresses circumstances where
the inmate is severely mentally ill at the time of
execution, and the recommendation seeks to
provide greater clarity as to when this exemption
applies.65 In particular, the recommendation seeks
“to emphasize the need for a deeper understanding
of the state's justifying purpose for the execution,”
and to “require that an offender not only must be
‘aware’ of the nature and purpose of punishment
but also must ‘appreciate’ its personal application
in the offender's own case -- that is, why it is being
imposed on the offender.” To a certain degree,
Panetti’s requirement that the offender have a
rational understanding of the reason for his
pending execution is consistent with this
recommendation, although it remains to be seen if
the language of Panetti will effect a practical
change in the scope of the protection for the
severely mentally ill. In addition, the ABA
recommendation emphasizes the importance of the
offender’s awareness of the punishment of death
and notes that severe mental illness with delusional
belief systems can often cause an individual to fail
to understand meaningfully that an execution will
result in physical, permanent death.66
3. International Calls for a Ban on the
Execution of the Mentally Ill
The international community also recognizes the
moral and ethical concerns raised by executing
mentally ill prisoners. The United Nations
Commission on Human Rights “urges all states that
maintain the death penalty not to impose it on a
person suffering from any form of mental disorder;
not to execute any such person.”67 While promoting
abolition and applauding states that have
eliminated the death penalty, the Commission
provides recommendations for retention states to
assure that the punishment is meted out only for
the most serious crimes and to the most
blameworthy persons.68 In this
regard, the Commission calls
on states not to subject the
mentally ill to the process of
execution.69 The Commission’s
recommendation is broader
than either the protection
afforded by the United States
Supreme Court or arguably
that proposed by the ABA. It
would assure that persons
suffering from severe mental
illnesses, including delusions, would not be forced
to suffer execution. 
4. Conclusion and Call for Greater
Protection of the Mentally Ill
Although the United States Supreme Court has
provided some protections for the mentally ill
facing executions, these protections are
inadequate and do not sufficiently protect many
mentally ill death row inmates. It is far too easy for
courts to find an individual who suffers from
serious or severe mental illness nonetheless
competent to suffer the penalty of death. This
practice offends many in the international
community and runs counter to the values and
recommendations of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights. If adopted, the
approach advocated by the ABA in its
recommendation and report would be an
important step forward in eliminating the
execution of the mentally ill in the United States.
Ultimately, however, a broad prohibition of the
execution of the mentally ill remains the best
solution to the ugly practice of subjecting the
mentally ill to the perils and arbitrariness of the
American death penalty system.
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that a person under sentence of death may be
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Code Ann., § 17-10-61 (“person under sentence of
death shall not be executed when it is determined
under the provisions of this article that the person is
mentally incompetent to be executed”); K.S.A. 22-
4006 (if at conclusion of hearing on competency to
execute, “judge determines that the convict is
insane, the judge shall suspend the execution until
further order”); KRS § 431.240 (“[i]f the condemned
person is insane, as defined in KRS 431.213 . . . on
the day designated for the execution, the execution
shall be suspended until the condemned is restored
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the execution of the sentence”); R.R.S. Neb. § 29-
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solemn obligation of a civilized society. Id. at 417.
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decision to forgo or terminate post-conviction
proceedings available to challenge the validity of
the conviction or sentence;” or is unable “(ii) to
understand or communicate pertinent information,
or otherwise assist counsel, in relation to specific
claims bearing on the validity of the conviction or
sentence that cannot be fairly resolved without the
prisoner’s participation.”
65 Id. at 675. The recommendation also sets out
procedures for determining competency to execute.
These procedures are set forth below:
(d) Procedure in Cases Involving Prisoners Unable
to Understand the Punishment or its Purpose. If,
after challenges to the validity of the conviction
and death sentence have been exhausted and
execution has been scheduled, a court finds that
a prisoner has a mental disorder or disability that
significantly impairs his or her capacity to
understand the nature and purpose of the
punishment, or to appreciate the reason for its
imposition in the prisoner’s own case, the
sentence of death should be reduced to the
sentence imposed in capital cases when execution
is not an option.
ABA Recommendation and Report, ¶ 3. 
66 Id. at 676. 
67 http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/
mental_illness.html.
68 See Commission on Human Rights resolution
2003/67; Commission on Human Rights resolution
2000/65.
69 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2003/67,
(4)(g); Commission on Human Rights resolution
2000/65, (3)(e). See also (http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/justice-and-prison reform/
compendium.html).
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